| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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method of executing commands remotely. There are no rexec clients in
the FreeBSD tree, and the client function rexec(3) is present only in
libcompat. It has been documented as "obsolete" since 4.3BSD, and its
use has been discouraged in the man page for over 10 years.
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svn path=/head/; revision=147270
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Noticed by: bde
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svn path=/head/; revision=145177
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an invalid type pun.
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svn path=/head/; revision=144795
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Noticed by: tinderbox, stefanf
Pointy hat to: nectar
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svn path=/head/; revision=144754
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Noticed by: Steve Kargl <sgk@troutmask.apl.washington.edu>
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svn path=/head/; revision=144680
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during authentication. Thus we need to call getpwnam *after* the user
has been authenticated. Colin mentioned that we should also move the
check for root in that case.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=144668
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5.0-RELEASE), a visually elusive bug was introduced. A comparison
operator was changed to assignment. As a result, rexecd behaved
always as if the `-i' option had been specified. It would allow root
logins. This commit corrects the situation in the obvious way.
A separate bug was introduced at the same time. The PAM library
functions are called between the invocation of getpwnam(3) and the use
of the returned static object. Since many PAM library functions
result in additional getpwnam(3) calls, the contents of the returned
static object could be changed from under rexecd. With this commit,
getpwnam_r(3) is used instead.
Other PAM-using applications should be reviewed for similar errors in
getpw* usage.
Security: rexecd's documented default policy of disallowing root
logins was not enforced.
Reviewed by: cperciva
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=144180
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svn path=/head/; revision=143907
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use of struct sockaddr_strage * is thought as not good manner. :)
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svn path=/head/; revision=142900
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struct sockaddr_storage *, there's no point in casting it prematurely
to a struct sockaddr *. This unbreaks WARNS=6 on sparc64.
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svn path=/head/; revision=142329
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=142317
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socklen_t * argument.
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svn path=/head/; revision=141918
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svn path=/head/; revision=140414
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svn path=/head/; revision=131487
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Approved by: das (mentor)
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svn path=/head/; revision=129658
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svn path=/head/; revision=116034
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=99500
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Reviewed by: bde
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svn path=/head/; revision=95980
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Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
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svn path=/head/; revision=95915
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Tested by: kuriyama
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svn path=/head/; revision=94830
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I dunno if there is an IPv6 supported rexec client. So, it was
tested that this change doesn't break an IPv4.
Tested by: kuriyama (IPv4 only)
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svn path=/head/; revision=94828
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Hint by: ume
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svn path=/head/; revision=94824
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o register removal
o use new style prototypes and function definitions
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svn path=/head/; revision=90377
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are not yet warning-clean. Tested on i386 and alpha.
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svn path=/head/; revision=90164
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svn path=/head/; revision=81118
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definitions are more readable, and it's possible that they're
more portable to pathalogical platforms.
Submitted by: David Hill <david@phobia.ms>
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svn path=/head/; revision=80381
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svn path=/head/; revision=79754
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=79529
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I believe I have done due dilligence on this, but I'd appreciate
decent test scenarios and sucess (or failure) reports.
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svn path=/head/; revision=79466
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Idea from: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
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svn path=/head/; revision=79452
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svn path=/head/; revision=76183
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- MAN[1-9] -> MAN.
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svn path=/head/; revision=74814
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svn path=/head/; revision=74529
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svn path=/head/; revision=69313
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svn path=/head/; revision=68949
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Submitted by: sheldonh@uunet.co.za
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svn path=/head/; revision=60594
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(presuming that the user in question is not in /etc/ftpusers and
does not have a null password).
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svn path=/head/; revision=60507
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=50476
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friends are terminated and allow for a maximum
host name length of MAXHOSTNAMELEN - 1.
Put parenthesis around sizeof args.
Make some variables static.
Fix telnetd -u (broken by my last commit)
Prompted by: bde
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svn path=/head/; revision=45422
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svn path=/head/; revision=45396
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gethostbyaddr() & gethostbyname().
Remove brokeness in ftpd for hosts of MAXHOSTNAMELEN length.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=45393
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=31419
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compatibility problem at the same time. Some buffer made large enough
for worst case hostname.
fixes PR 2593.
Reviewed by: Dan Cross and maybe others
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svn path=/head/; revision=24189
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=22989
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rev 1.7 deraadt:
buf oflow
Obtained from: OpenBSD
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svn path=/head/; revision=22457
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This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=21673
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it is both uneeded and breaks certain lock-step timing in the rexec
protocol.
Yes, an attacker can "relay" connections using this trick, but a properly
configured firewall that would make this sort of subterfuge necessary in the
first place (instead of direct packet spoofing) would also thwart useful
attacks based on this.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=19924
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succeeded.
Never allow the reverse channel to be to a privileged port.
Cannidate for: 2.1 and 2.2 branches
Reviewed by: pst (with local cleanups)
Submitted by: Cy Shubert <cy@cwsys.cwent.com>
Obtained from: Jaeger <jaeger@dhp.com> via BUGTRAQ
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=19871
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=18471
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=10401
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