path: root/lib/libsys/setcred.2

.\"
.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
.\"
.\" Copyright © 2024 The FreeBSD Foundation
.\"
.\" This documentation was written by Olivier Certner <olce.freebsd@certner.fr>
.\" at Kumacom SARL under sponsorship from the FreeBSD Foundation.
.\"
.Dd August 29, 2025
.Dt SETCRED 2
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm setcred
.Nd set current process credentials atomically
.Sh LIBRARY
.Lb libc
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.In sys/ucred.h
.Ft int
.Fn setcred "u_int flags" "const struct setcred *wcred" "size_t size"
.Sh DESCRIPTION
The
.Fn setcred
system call can set any combination of user-accessible credentials of the
current process in an atomic manner.
.Pp
This system call is normally permitted only for processes having the ID of the
super-user (0) as their effective user ID, or not at all if the
.Xr sysctl 8
variable
.Va security.bsd.suser_enabled
is zero or some active MAC policy specifically denies these processes.
.Pp
Some MAC policies, such as
.Xr mac_do 4 ,
may also allow unprivileged users to call it successfully, possibly depending on
the exact credentials transition requested, once again unless any active MAC
policy specifically denies that.
.Pp
The
.Fa flags
argument serves to indicate which process credentials should be changed by the
call.
Allowed flags are:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width "SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS   " -compact
.It Fa SETCREDF_UID
Set the effective user ID.
.It Fa SETCREDF_RUID
Set the real user ID.
.It Fa SETCREDF_SVUID
Set the saved user ID.
.It Fa SETCREDF_GID
Set the effective group ID.
.It Fa SETCREDF_RGID
Set the real group ID.
.It Fa SETCREDF_SVGID
Set the saved group ID.
.It Fa SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS
Set the supplementary group list.
.It Fa SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL
Set the MAC label.
.El
.Pp
The
.Vt struct setcred
structure is currently defined as:
.Bd -literal
struct setcred {
	uid_t	 sc_uid;		/* effective user id */
	uid_t	 sc_ruid;		/* real user id */
	uid_t	 sc_svuid;		/* saved user id */
	gid_t	 sc_gid;		/* effective group id */
	gid_t	 sc_rgid;		/* real group id */
	gid_t	 sc_svgid;		/* saved group id */
	u_int	 sc_pad;		/* padding, unused */
	u_int	 sc_supp_groups_nb;	/* supplementary groups number */
	gid_t	*sc_supp_groups;	/* supplementary groups */
	struct mac *sc_label;		/* MAC label */
};
.Ed
.Pp
Its fields are:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width "sc_supp_groups_nb   " -compact
.It Fa sc_uid
The ID to set the effective user to, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_UID
is specified.
.It Fa sc_ruid
The ID to set the real user to, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_RUID
is specified.
.It Fa sc_svuid
The ID to set the saved user to, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_SVUID
is specified.
.It Fa sc_gid
The ID to set the effective group to, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_GID
is specified.
.It Fa sc_rgid
The ID to set the real group to, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_RGID
is specified.
.It Fa sc_svgid
The ID to set the saved group to, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_SVGID
is specified.
.It Fa sc_supp_groups_nb
The size of array
.Fa sc_supp_groups ,
if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS
is specified.
It must be less than or equal to
.Dv {NGROUPS_MAX} .
.It Fa sc_supp_groups
An array of IDs to set the supplementary groups to, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS
is specified.
.It Fa sc_label
A pointer to a valid MAC label structure, e.g., built with the
.Xr mac_from_text 3
function, if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL
is specified.
.El
.Pp
For forward compatibility and security reasons, it is recommended that users
always initialize objects of type
.Vt struct setcred
with the provided initializer:
.Dv SETCRED_INITIALIZER .
.Pp
The
.Fa size
argument must be the size of the passed
.Fa wcred
structure.
.Sh RETURN VALUES
.Rv -std
.Sh ERRORS
The
.Fn setcred
system call will fail if:
.Bl -tag -width Er
.It Bq Er EINVAL
Unrecognized flags were passed in
.Fa flags ,
or the
.Fa size
parameter does not match the size of
.Vt struct setcred ,
or the field
.Fa sc_supp_group_nb
has a value strictly greater than
.Dv {NGROUPS_MAX}
.Po if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS
was supplied
.Pc ,
or the MAC label pointed to by field
.Fa sc_label
is invalid
.Po if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL
was supplied
.Pc .
.It Bq Er EFAULT
The
.Fa wcred
pointer, or pointers in fields
.Fa sc_supp_groups
.Po if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_SUPP_GROUPS
was supplied
.Pc
or
.Fa sc_label
.Po if flag
.Dv SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL
was supplied
.Pc
point to invalid locations.
.It Bq Er EPERM
The user is not the super-user and/or the requested credentials transition is
not allowed by the system or MAC modules.
.It Bq Er EOPNOTSUPP
Some of the requested credentials have a type that the system does not support.
This currently can occur only if the kernel has been compiled without MAC and
.Dv SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL
has been passed.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr issetugid 2 ,
.Xr setregid 2 ,
.Xr setreuid 2 ,
.Xr setuid 2 ,
.Xr mac_text 3 ,
.Xr mac 4 ,
.Xr mac_do 4 ,
.Xr maclabel 7
.Sh STANDARDS
The
.Fn setcred
system call is specific to
.Fx .
.Pp
A call to
.Fn setcred
usually changes process credentials that are listed by POSIX/SUS standards.
The changed values then produce the effects with respect to the rest of the
system that are described in these standards, as if these changes had resulted
from calling standard or traditional credentials-setting functions.
Currently, all flags but
.Dv SETCREDF_MAC_LABEL
lead to modifying standard credentials.
.Pp
The only differences in using
.Fn setcred
to change standard credentials instead of standard or traditional functions are:
.Pp
.Bl -bullet -compact
.It
All requested changes are performed atomically.
.It
Only the super-user or an unprivileged user authorized by some MAC module can
successfully call
.Fn setcred ,
even if the standard system calls would have authorized any unprivileged user to
effect the same changes.
For example,
.Fn seteuid
allows any unprivileged user to change the effective user ID to either the real
or saved ones, while
.Fn setcred
called with flag
.Dv SETCREDF_UID
does not.
.El
.Sh HISTORY
The
.Fn setcred
system call appeared in
.Fx 14.3 .
.Pp
Traditionally in UNIX, all credential changes beyond shuffles of effective, real
and saved IDs have been done by setuid binaries that successively call multiple
credentials-setting system calls and in a specific order.
For example, to change all user IDs to that of some unprivileged user,
.Fn setuid
must be called last so that all other credentials-changing calls can be
performed successfully beforehand, as they require super-user privileges.
.Pp
This piecewise approach causes such a process to transiently hold high privilege
credentials that are neither the original nor necessarily the desired final
ones.
Besides opening a transition window where possible vulnerabilities could have
catastrophic consequences, it makes it impossible for the kernel to enforce that
only certain transitions of credentials are allowed.
.Pp
The necessity of an atomic, global approach to changing credentials clearly
appeared while working on extending
.Xr mac_do 4
to allow rules to authorize only specific changes of primary or supplementary
groups, which prompted the addition of
.Fn setcred .
.Sh AUTHORS
The
.Fn setcred
system call and this manual page were written by
.An Olivier Certner Aq Mt olce.freebsd@certner.fr .
.Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The same considerations as those of standard or traditional credentials-setting
system calls apply to
.Fn setcred ,
except for the lack of atomicity of successive such calls.
.Pp
In particular, please consult section
.Sy SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
of the
.Xr setuid 2
manual page about the absence of effect of changing standard credentials on
already open files.