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-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:15.arm64.asc137
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:16.vfs.asc131
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:17.bnxt.asc140
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:18.freebsd-update.asc140
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:08.openssl.asc207
-rw-r--r--website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:09.netinet.asc162
6 files changed, 917 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:15.arm64.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:15.arm64.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2da868709
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:15.arm64.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-25:15.arm64 Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: arm64 syscall(2) allows unprivileged user to panic kernel
+
+Category: core
+Module: arm64
+Announced: 2025-09-16
+Credits: Juniper Networks, Inc.
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2025-08-25 15:23:01 UTC (stable/14, 14.3-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-16 16:31:06 UTC (releng/14.3, 14.3-RELEASE-p3)
+ 2025-09-16 16:31:17 UTC (releng/14.2, 14.2-RELEASE-p6)
+ 2025-08-25 15:23:22 UTC (stable/13, 13.5-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-16 16:31:26 UTC (releng/13.5, 13.5-RELEASE-p4)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The FreeBSD arm64 kernel implements a 32-bit compatibility layer, enabling
+execution of unmodified 32-bit arm binaries on a 64-bit system.
+
+FreeBSD implements a pseudo system call, syscall(2), which lets the caller
+invoke a system call selected using the first system call argument.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The 32-bit compatibility layer implements syscall(2). It performs some
+validation of the system call parameters and explicitly calls panic() to
+panic the system if an unexpected state is reached.
+
+It is possible to construct a program which can reach this unexpected state,
+resulting in a panic. In particular, no particular privileges are required
+to do so.
+
+III. Impact
+
+An unprivileged user may be able to trigger a panic.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available. Non-arm64 platforms are unaffected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms,
+or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8)
+utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:15/arm64.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:15/arm64.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify arm64.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
+following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/14/ 17d87881a363 stable/14-n272249
+releng/14.3/ 99012995b4c6 releng/14.3-n271440
+releng/14.2/ 722746b39e6e releng/14.2-n269534
+stable/13/ 98ac13c4baf5 stable/13-n259404
+releng/13.5/ 751971e55454 releng/13.5-n259175
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:15.arm64.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:16.vfs.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:16.vfs.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..648944e6a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:16.vfs.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-25:16.vfs Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: copy_file_range(2) fails to set output parameters
+
+Category: core
+Module: vfs
+Announced: 2025-09-16
+Affects: FreeBSD 14.3
+Corrected: 2025-08-23 21:25:20 UTC (stable/14, 14.3-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-16 16:31:07 UTC (releng/14.3, 14.3-RELEASE-p3)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+copy_file_range(2) is a system call which takes two file descriptors as input
+and copies data from one file to the other.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+The copy_file_range(2) system call accepts two optional pointer arguments,
+inoffp and outoffp. When non-NULL, the kernel is to use their values to
+determine the starting offsets for the input and output files, respectively.
+In this case, the seek offset corresponding to the file descriptor is not
+used or updated.
+
+When finishing the copy, the kernel is supposed to write updated offsets to
+the pointed-to values. However, it does not do so.
+
+III. Impact
+
+Applications which rely on this behaviour may behave incorrectly. No such
+applications exist in the base system.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms,
+or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8)
+utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r now
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:16/vfs.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:16/vfs.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify vfs.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
+following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/14/ 2fd0083fcc23 stable/14-n272229
+releng/14.3/ d1e981cbf3bd releng/14.3-n271441
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=288985>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:16.vfs.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:17.bnxt.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:17.bnxt.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..df6b461cfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:17.bnxt.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-25:17.bnxt Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: bnxt(4) fails to set media type in some cases
+
+Category: core
+Module: bnxt
+Announced: 2025-09-16
+Affects: FreeBSD 14.3
+Corrected: 2025-06-22 07:18:55 UTC (stable/14, 14.3-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-16 16:31:08 UTC (releng/14.3, 14.3-RELEASE-p3)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The bnxt(4) driver provides support for Broadcom NetXtreme-C/NetXtreme-E Family
+of Ethernet controllers. A key function of the driver is to report the various
+supported physical media types and operational modes (e.g., 1000base-T,
+40GBASE-AOC, full-duplex, autoselect) to the operating system's ifmedia
+interface. This allows network administrators to view and configure the
+interface link settings.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+A logic error was introduced into the bnxt(4) driver which prevented the proper
+population of the supported media list for several physical connection types.
+Inside the function responsible for building this list, a switch statement
+incorrectly used return statements instead of break statements. This caused
+the function to exit prematurely after identifying certain media types,
+including common BASE-T (copper), 40G Active Optical Cable (AOC), and 1G-CX
+connections, before the corresponding speed and duplex options could be
+registered with the network subsystem.
+
+III. Impact
+
+For network controllers using the affected media types, the driver fails to
+advertise any supported link modes. An administrator running ifconfig(8) on
+the interface would see incorrect media (unknown). Because of this, the
+network interface may be unable to establish a link, as the operating system
+cannot properly configure it or initiate auto-negotiation. The network port
+will be unusable.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available. Only systems that uses bnxt(4) device with the
+affected media types are affected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms,
+or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8)
+utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r now
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:17/bnxt.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:17/bnxt.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify bnxt.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
+following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/14/ 33f65f12eba1 stable/14-n271757
+releng/14.3/ c07b1838f9c9 releng/14.3-n271442
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=33f65f12eba1>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=287395>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:17.bnxt.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+hHpd38wxOpTs5nk4qbVZlS2DgRuTSO/VU0IMphaIwBhwHkZaoWY=
+=jvzm
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:18.freebsd-update.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:18.freebsd-update.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..879a139248
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:18.freebsd-update.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-EN-25:18.freebsd-update Errata Notice
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: freebsd-update(8) installs libraries in incorrect order
+
+Category: core
+Module: freebsd-update
+Announced: 2025-09-30
+Credits: Graham Perrin
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2025-09-25 19:26:37 UTC (stable/15, 15.0-ALPHA4)
+ 2025-09-25 19:27:06 UTC (stable/14, 14.3-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-30 15:37:15 UTC (releng/14.3, 14.3-RELEASE-p4)
+ 2025-09-30 15:37:24 UTC (releng/14.2, 14.2-RELEASE-p7)
+ 2025-09-25 19:27:34 UTC (stable/13, 13.5-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-30 15:37:34 UTC (releng/13.5, 13.5-RELEASE-p5)
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
+Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
+branches, and the following sections, please visit
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+The freebsd-update(8) utility is used to fetch, install, and rollback
+binary updates to the FreeBSD base system. In addition to security and
+errata updates within a release (its original purpose), freebsd-update(8)
+can be used to upgrade to a newer FreeBSD release.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+When installing updates, freebsd-update(8) did not enforce ordering between
+the C standard library ("libc") and the system library ("libsys") which was
+introduced in FreeBSD 15.0.
+
+III. Impact
+
+When using freebsd-update(8) to upgrade a system from FreeBSD 13.x or 14.x to
+FreeBSD 15.0, freebsd-update(8) would install a new libc which depends on
+libsys before the libsys library existed. This resulted in the rest of the
+update failing to install and a mostly-unusable system, with only statically
+linked binaries (e.g. in /rescue) functioning.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available, but this misbehaviour only applies to using
+freebsd-update(8) to upgrade to FreeBSD 15.0; applying security and errata
+updates (including this one) within a release branch is unaffected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
+branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms,
+or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8)
+utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+
+2) To update your system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:18/freebsd-update.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-25:18/freebsd-update.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify freebsd-update.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
+following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/15/ 8134e7f4b406 stable/15-n280326
+stable/14/ e26928669f39 stable/14-n272484
+releng/14.3/ 978e04ff5bcf releng/14.3-n271445
+releng/14.2/ 3447fea3523b releng/14.2-n269536
+stable/13/ 87eb52f1b061 stable/13-n259445
+releng/13.5/ ab91dd76ff72 releng/13.5-n259177
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=289769>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-25:18.freebsd-update.asc>
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diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:08.openssl.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:08.openssl.asc
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--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-25:08.openssl Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
+
+Category: contrib
+Module: openssl
+Announced: 2025-09-30
+Credits: Stanislav Fort (Aisle Research)
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2025-09-30 15:26:14 UTC (stable/15, 15.0-ALPHA4)
+ 2025-09-30 15:28:38 UTC (stable/14, 14.3-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-30 15:37:16 UTC (releng/14.3, 14.3-RELEASE-p4)
+ 2025-09-30 15:37:25 UTC (releng/14.2, 14.2-RELEASE-p7)
+ 2025-09-30 15:30:02 UTC (stable/13, 13.5-STABLE)
+ 2025-09-30 15:37:35 UTC (releng/13.5, 13.5-RELEASE-p5)
+CVE Name: CVE-2025-9230, CVE-2025-9231, CVE-2025-9232
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is a
+collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
+Open Source toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. It is
+also a general-purpose cryptography library.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+* Out-of-bounds read & write in RFC 3211 KEK Unwrap (CVE-2025-9230)
+Affects: FreeBSD 15.x, 14.x, and 13.x
+
+An application trying to decrypt cryptographic message syntax (CMS) messages
+encrypted using password based encryption can trigger an out-of-bounds read
+and write.
+
+* Timing side-channel in SM2 algorithm on 64 bit ARM (CVE-2025-9231)
+Affects: FreeBSD 15.x only
+
+A timing side-channel which could potentially allow remote recovery of the
+private key exists in the SM2 algorithm implementation on 64-bit ARM
+platforms.
+
+* Out-of-bounds read in HTTP client no_proxy handling (CVE-2025-9232)
+Affects: FreeBSD 15.x and 14.x only
+
+An application using the OpenSSL HTTP client API functions may trigger an
+out-of-bounds read if the "no_proxy" environment variable is set and the host
+portion of the authority component of the HTTP URL is an IPv6 address.
+
+III. Impact
+
+* Out-of-bounds read & write in RFC 3211 KEK Unwrap (CVE-2025-9230)
+Affects: FreeBSD 15.x, 14.x, and 13.x
+
+The out-of-bounds read may trigger a crash which leads to denial of service
+for an application. The out-of-bounds write can cause a memory corruption
+which can have various consequences including a denial of service or
+execution of attacker-supplied code.
+
+Although the consequences of a successful exploit of this vulnerability
+could be severe, the probability that an attacker would be able to
+perform it is low. Password based (PWRI) encryption support in CMS
+messages is very rarely used.
+
+* Timing side-channel in SM2 algorithm on 64 bit ARM (CVE-2025-9231)
+Affects: FreeBSD 15.x only
+
+A timing side-channel in SM2 signature computations on 64 bit ARM platforms
+could allow recovering the private key by an attacker.
+
+OpenSSL does not directly support certificates with SM2 keys in TLS, and so
+this CVE is not relevant in most TLS contexts. However, it is possible to
+add support for such certificates via a custom provider.
+
+* Out-of-bounds read in HTTP client no_proxy handling (CVE-2025-9232)
+Affects: FreeBSD 15.x and 14.x only
+
+An out-of-bounds read can trigger a crash which leads to denial of service
+for an application.
+
+The OpenSSL HTTP client API functions can be used directly by applications
+but they are also used by the OCSP client functions and CMP (Certificate
+Management Protocol) client implementation in OpenSSL. However the URLs used
+by these implementations are unlikely to be controlled by an attacker.
+
+In this vulnerable code the out of bounds read can only trigger a crash.
+Furthermore the vulnerability requires an attacker-controlled URL to be
+passed from an application to the OpenSSL function and the user has to have
+a "no_proxy" environment variable set.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available. Several of the issues have mitigating factors.
+Please see the Impact section for more details.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms,
+or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8)
+utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 15.x]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:08/openssl-15.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:08/openssl-15.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-15.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 14.x]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:08/openssl-14.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:08/openssl-14.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-14.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 13.5]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:08/openssl-13.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:08/openssl-13.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify openssl-13.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
+described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
+
+Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
+following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/15/ 4d6fd774b5b3 stable/15-n280387
+stable/14/ 270158508d7c stable/14-n272541
+releng/14.3/ 75d258af9fe9 releng/14.3-n271446
+releng/14.2/ 6a0d914d9c3e releng/14.2-n269537
+stable/13/ c0dbaf2b5dbd stable/13-n259448
+releng/13.5/ ae7c74cfa531 releng/13.5-n259178
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20250930.txt>
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-9230>
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-9231>
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-9232>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:08.openssl.asc>
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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diff --git a/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:09.netinet.asc b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:09.netinet.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..49fe1c653f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/static/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:09.netinet.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA512
+
+=============================================================================
+FreeBSD-SA-25:09.netinet Security Advisory
+ The FreeBSD Project
+
+Topic: SO_REUSEPORT_LB breaks connect(2) for UDP sockets
+
+Category: core
+Module: netinet
+Announced: 2025-10-22
+Credits: MSc. student Omer Ben Simhon and Prof. Amit Klein,
+ both from the Hebrew University School of Computer
+ Science and Engineering
+Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
+Corrected: 2025-10-22 15:48:25 UTC (stable/15, 15.0-STABLE)
+ 2025-10-22 15:50:30 UTC (releng/15.0, 15.0-BETA2-p1)
+ 2025-10-22 15:48:51 UTC (stable/14, 14.3-STABLE)
+ 2025-10-22 15:51:57 UTC (releng/14.3, 14.3-RELEASE-p5)
+ 2025-10-22 15:49:32 UTC (stable/13, 13.4-STABLE)
+ 2025-10-22 15:53:35 UTC (releng/13.5, 13.5-RELEASE-p6)
+CVE Name: CVE-2025-24934
+
+For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
+including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
+following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
+
+I. Background
+
+SO_REUSEPORT_LB is a socket option, set by setsockopt(2), which allows multiple
+TCP or UDP sockets to bind to the same socket address, creating a
+load-balancing group. Incoming packets and connections are distributed evenly
+among sockets in a group. This helps network services avoid scalability
+bottlenecks caused by having a single TCP listening socket. In particular, it
+is expected that sockets belonging to a load-balancing group will accept
+packets from any source address.
+
+II. Problem Description
+
+Connected sockets are not intended to belong to load-balancing groups.
+However, the kernel failed to check the connection state of sockets when adding
+them to load-balancing groups. Furthermore, when looking up the destination
+socket for an incoming packet, the kernel will match a socket belonging to a
+load-balancing group even if it is connected.
+
+Connected sockets are only supposed to receive packets originating from the
+connected host. The above behavior violates this contract.
+
+III. Impact
+
+Software which sets SO_REUSEPORT_LB on a socket and then connects it to a host
+will not observe any problems. However, due to its membership in a
+load-balancing group, that socket will receive packets originating from any
+host. This breaks the contract of the connect(2) and implied connect via
+sendto(2), and may leave the application vulnerable to spoofing attacks.
+
+IV. Workaround
+
+No workaround is available. Software which does not use SO_REUSEPORT_LB is
+not affected.
+
+V. Solution
+
+Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
+release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
+
+Perform one of the following:
+
+1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
+
+Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms,
+or the i386 platform on FreeBSD 13, can be updated via the freebsd-update(8)
+utility:
+
+# freebsd-update fetch
+# freebsd-update install
+# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
+
+2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
+
+The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
+FreeBSD release branches.
+
+a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
+detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
+
+[FreeBSD 15.x]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:09/netinet-15.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:09/netinet-15.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify netinet-15.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 14.x]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:09/netinet-14.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:09/netinet-14.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify netinet-14.patch.asc
+
+[FreeBSD 13.x]
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:09/netinet-13.patch
+# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-25:09/netinet-13.patch.asc
+# gpg --verify netinet-13.patch.asc
+
+b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
+
+# cd /usr/src
+# patch < /path/to/patch
+
+c) Recompile your kernel as described in
+<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
+system.
+
+VI. Correction details
+
+This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the
+following stable and release branches:
+
+Branch/path Hash Revision
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+stable/15/ ef159100ec2b stable/15-n280782
+releng/15.0/ 98c539667881 releng/15.0-n280723
+stable/14/ e276759b3687 stable/14-n272700
+releng/14.3/ 058bcb57cd4b releng/14.3-n271448
+stable/13/ df888c8f41f6 stable/13-n259508
+releng/13.5/ 90e14aa082d3 releng/13.5-n259180
+- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
+particular commit:
+
+# git show --stat <commit hash>
+
+Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
+
+<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
+
+To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
+nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
+
+# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
+
+VII. References
+
+<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-24934>
+
+The latest revision of this advisory is available at
+<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-25:09.netinet.asc>
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