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authorAdam Weinberger <adamw@FreeBSD.org>2025-03-03 04:00:23 +0000
committerAdam Weinberger <adamw@FreeBSD.org>2025-03-03 04:00:23 +0000
commitc7aeeb0958ae7cba9ceb3f734c0f21e1722d8680 (patch)
tree13400d6cbf6f7cc397ada3d315a0323448cd9764 /mail/mpop/(public-mirror)
parentb00071424803f4c17fb1d267ed2e827f438b651b (diff)
editors/vim: Update to 9.1.1164 (security, high severity)HEADmain
From the Github Advisory (https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-wfmf-8626-q3r3): Summary: Potential code execution with tar.vim and special crafted tar files. Description: Vim is distributed with the tar.vim plugin, that allows easy editing and viewing of (compressed or uncompressed) tar files. Since commit 129a844 (Nov 11, 2024 runtime(tar): Update tar.vim to support permissions), the tar.vim plugin uses the ":read " ex command line to append below the cursor position, however the is not sanitized and is taken literaly from the tar archive. This allows to execute shell commands via special crafted tar archives. Whether this really happens, depends on the shell being used ('shell' option, which is set using $SHELL). Impact: Impact is high but a user must be convinced to edit such a file using Vim which will reveal the filename, so a careful user may suspect some strange things going on. The Vim project would like to thank RyotaK (GMO Flatt Security Inc) for reporting this issue. The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch v9.1.1164. MFH: 2025Q1 Security: GHSA-wfmf-8626-q3r3
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