diff options
| author | Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> | 2023-07-31 20:50:33 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> | 2023-07-31 20:50:33 +0000 |
| commit | 5cb624204c36be8911c7fd5eca62a6bff17df155 (patch) | |
| tree | 935806c0a3108feb71cfd2e3cd686ffae255fa63 /security/openssl31 | |
| parent | f144c0373f258b4a53678f8a23ca2dbf159ab683 (diff) | |
| download | ports-5cb624204c36be8911c7fd5eca62a6bff17df155.tar.gz ports-5cb624204c36be8911c7fd5eca62a6bff17df155.zip | |
security/openssl31: Security update for CVE-2023-3817 (Low)
Security: bad6588e-2fe0-11ee-a0d1-84a93843eb75
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssl31')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl31/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 | 57 |
2 files changed, 58 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl31/Makefile b/security/openssl31/Makefile index 29221630a1e3..0625a0573716 100644 --- a/security/openssl31/Makefile +++ b/security/openssl31/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ PORTNAME= openssl PORTVERSION= 3.1.1 -PORTREVISION= 1 +PORTREVISION= 2 CATEGORIES= security devel MASTER_SITES= https://www.openssl.org/source/ \ ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/ diff --git a/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 b/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cbb1a7ae0128 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/openssl31/files/patch-CVE-2023-3817 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 6a1eb62c29db6cb5eec707f9338aee00f44e26f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 15:22:48 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is + obviously invalid + +If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q +is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1. + +We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that +q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that +q value. + +Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value +such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long +computations. + +Fixes CVE-2023-3817 + +Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> +Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> +Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550) + +(cherry picked from commit 1c16253f3c3a8d1e25918c3f404aae6a5b0893de) +--- + crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +index aef6f9b1b77d..fbe279756954 100644 +--- crypto/dh/dh_check.c.orig ++++ crypto/dh/dh_check.c +@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) + #ifdef FIPS_MODULE + return DH_check_params(dh, ret); + #else +- int ok = 0, r; ++ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL; + int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh); +@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) + goto err; + + if (dh->params.q != NULL) { ++ if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0) ++ q_good = 1; ++ else ++ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE; ++ } ++ ++ if (q_good) { + if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) + *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; + else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0) |