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--- client/cl_parse.c.orig 2002-10-10 09:40:17 UTC
+++ client/cl_parse.c
@@ -474,6 +474,9 @@ void CL_LoadClientinfo (clientinfo_t *ci, char *s)
strncpy(ci->cinfo, s, sizeof(ci->cinfo));
ci->cinfo[sizeof(ci->cinfo)-1] = 0;
+ // sku - avoid potential buffer overflow vulnerability
+ s = ci->cinfo;
+
// isolate the player's name
strncpy(ci->name, s, sizeof(ci->name));
ci->name[sizeof(ci->name)-1] = 0;
@@ -602,6 +605,7 @@ void CL_ParseConfigString (void)
int i;
char *s;
char olds[MAX_QPATH];
+ int length;
i = MSG_ReadShort (&net_message);
if (i < 0 || i >= MAX_CONFIGSTRINGS)
@@ -610,6 +614,12 @@ void CL_ParseConfigString (void)
strncpy (olds, cl.configstrings[i], sizeof(olds));
olds[sizeof(olds) - 1] = 0;
+
+ // sku - avoid potential buffer overflow vulnerability
+ length = strlen (s);
+ if (length > sizeof cl.configstrings - sizeof cl.configstrings[0] * i - 1) {
+ Com_Error (ERR_DROP, "CL_ParseConfigString: oversize configstring");
+ }
strcpy (cl.configstrings[i], s);
--- qcommon/cmd.c.orig 2002-12-12 08:44:37 UTC
+++ qcommon/cmd.c
@@ -217,6 +217,10 @@ void Cbuf_Execute (void)
}
+ // sku - remove potential buffer overflow vulnerability
+ if (i > sizeof line - 1) {
+ i = sizeof line - 1;
+ }
memcpy (line, text, i);
line[i] = 0;
@@ -679,7 +683,8 @@ void Cmd_TokenizeString (char *text, qboolean macroExp
{
int l;
- strcpy (cmd_args, text);
+ // sku - remove potential buffer overflow vulnerability
+ strncpy (cmd_args, text, sizeof cmd_args);
// strip off any trailing whitespace
l = strlen(cmd_args) - 1;
--- qcommon/common.c.orig 2002-12-13 11:33:44 UTC
+++ qcommon/common.c
@@ -776,7 +776,9 @@ char *MSG_ReadString (sizebuf_t *msg_read)
l = 0;
do
{
- c = MSG_ReadChar (msg_read);
+ // sku - replaced MSG_ReadChar with MSG_ReadByte to avoid
+ // potential vulnerability
+ c = MSG_ReadByte (msg_read);
if (c == -1 || c == 0)
break;
string[l] = c;
@@ -796,7 +798,9 @@ char *MSG_ReadStringLine (sizebuf_t *msg_read)
l = 0;
do
{
- c = MSG_ReadChar (msg_read);
+ // sku - replaced MSG_ReadChar with MSG_ReadByte to avoid
+ // potential vulnerability
+ c = MSG_ReadByte (msg_read);
if (c == -1 || c == 0 || c == '\n')
break;
string[l] = c;
--- server/sv_main.c.orig 2003-05-07 07:19:06 UTC
+++ server/sv_main.c
@@ -314,8 +314,9 @@ void SVC_DirectConnect (void)
challenge = atoi(Cmd_Argv(3));
- strncpy (userinfo, Cmd_Argv(4), sizeof(userinfo)-1);
- userinfo[sizeof(userinfo) - 1] = 0;
+ // sku - reserve 32 bytes for the IP address
+ strncpy (userinfo, Cmd_Argv(4), sizeof userinfo - 32);
+ userinfo[sizeof userinfo - 32] = 0;
// force the IP key/value pair so the game can filter based on ip
Info_SetValueForKey (userinfo, "ip", NET_AdrToString(net_from));
@@ -363,6 +364,11 @@ void SVC_DirectConnect (void)
&& ( cl->netchan.qport == qport
|| adr.port == cl->netchan.remote_address.port ) )
{
+ // sku - avoid reusing slot of the client already connected
+ if (cl->state != cs_zombie) {
+ Netchan_OutOfBandPrint (NS_SERVER, adr, "print\nConnected client from this IP is already present.\n");
+ return;
+ }
if (!NET_IsLocalAddress (adr) && (svs.realtime - cl->lastconnect) < ((int)sv_reconnect_limit->value * 1000))
{
Com_DPrintf ("%s:reconnect rejected : too soon\n", NET_AdrToString (adr));
--- server/sv_user.c.orig 2002-04-13 09:00:30 UTC
+++ server/sv_user.c
@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ void SV_Configstrings_f (void)
}
start = atoi(Cmd_Argv(2));
+ if (start < 0) {
+ start = 0; // sku - catch negative offsets
+ }
// write a packet full of data
@@ -150,9 +153,18 @@ void SV_Configstrings_f (void)
{
if (sv.configstrings[start][0])
{
+ int length;
+
+ // sku - write configstrings that exceed MAX_QPATH in proper-sized chunks
+ length = strlen (sv.configstrings[start]);
+ if (length > MAX_QPATH) {
+ length = MAX_QPATH;
+ }
+
MSG_WriteByte (&sv_client->netchan.message, svc_configstring);
MSG_WriteShort (&sv_client->netchan.message, start);
- MSG_WriteString (&sv_client->netchan.message, sv.configstrings[start]);
+ SZ_Write (&sv_client->netchan.message, sv.configstrings[start], length);
+ MSG_WriteByte (&sv_client->netchan.message, 0);
}
start++;
}
@@ -199,6 +211,9 @@ void SV_Baselines_f (void)
}
start = atoi(Cmd_Argv(2));
+ if (start < 0) {
+ start = 0;
+ }
memset (&nullstate, 0, sizeof(nullstate));
@@ -398,7 +413,7 @@ Dumps the serverinfo info string
*/
void SV_ShowServerinfo_f (void)
{
- Info_Print (Cvar_Serverinfo());
+// Info_Print (Cvar_Serverinfo());
}
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